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The following letter was sent to but not published by the New York Review of Books in reply to
Lisa Appignanesi’s Oct. 26, 2017 review of Frederick Crews’s critical biography of Freud.
NB: The NYRB did not publish Crews’s letter in defense of his own book, either.

Oct. 8, 2017
To the Editors:
In her review of Frederick Crews’s Freud: The Making of an Illusion Lisa Appignanesi argues that
Freud’s talking cures, while not working miracles, were innocuous compared to the harm done
under the regime of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
even now. While I share Lisa Appignanesi’s concern over the misapplication of diagnostic labels
and the over-prescription of psychoactive drugs, it should be noted that the interpretive
liberties taken by the psychoanalysts who ruled American psychiatry as late as the 1970’s had
much to do with the rise of the DSM diagnostic system as we know it. Instituted in DSM-III in
1980, this system proclaimed an “atheoretical” stance toward etiology, in direct reproach of the
psychoanalytic practice of etiological speculation. As Nancy Andreasen, a member of the DSMIII Task Force and later the editor-in-chief of the American Journal of Psychiatry, wrote in
retrospect, it was the recognition “that the psychodynamic emphasis had gone too far, leading
to diagnostic imprecision,” that led to the making of DSM-III.
In a cause célèbre of the 1970’s, D. L. Rosenhan and confederates hoaxed psychiatry by
presenting themselves severally at a dozen psychiatric hospitals, claiming to have heard voices
but otherwise behaving perfectly normally. They were admitted, labeled, degraded and held
for an average of 19 days. The psychodynamic assumptions then reigning made it possible for
the psychiatrists on hand to view these pseudo-patients as textbook cases, with one
unremarkable subject described in case notes as follows:
This 39-year-old male . . . manifests a long history of considerable ambivalence in close
relationships, which begins in early childhood. A warm relationship with his mother
cools during adolescence. . . . Affective stability is absent. . . And while he says that he
has several good friends, one senses considerable ambivalence embedded in those
relationships also.
As Rosenhan observed in his report on this affair in Science, “the facts of the case were
unintentionally distorted by staff” to bring them into line with psychodynamic theory. If this
sort of thing passes for diagnosis, no wonder the framers of DSM-III veered in the other
direction.
In an otherwise scathing critique of the Rosenhan hoax, Robert Spitzer, who captained the
construction of the new diagnostic system for DSM-III, wrote of the case of the 39-year-old
male: “Here, for the first time, I believe Rosenhan has hit the mark. What he described

happens all the time and often makes attendance at clinical case conferences extremely
painful, especially for those with a logical mind and a research orientation”—the last comment
a swipe at the Freudians. Spitzer himself trained and briefly practiced as a psychoanalyst only
to abandon that endeavor in favor of the new empiricism, based on checklists of symptoms.
Now that such checklists have proved to be recipes for the mass diagnosis of conditions like
ADHD—a category born as ADD in 1980—it seems appropriate to ask how so much faith and
credit came to be invested in them. If the psychiatrists who inherited Freud’s mantle had been
less arbitrary and capricious in their judgments (as in the case above), the new empiricism
might not have looked so good by comparison.
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